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Of all the international interactions the United States has had with the 
nations of the world, arguably one of the most contentious relationships has been 
with the country of Iran. Through the last 35 years, the United States has 
completely and utterly refused to have diplomatic relations with the nation, never 
reinstating a U.S. Embassy after the infamous Iran Hostage Crisis. All these years 
later, the ties remain the same: strained. But why is this? Is it still necessary? In 
short, no. While, historically, the U.S. and Iran's relationship has been one of 
espionage, covert operations and deceit, the U.S. presently faces a great 
opportunity, one that if both nations could reconcile the past, could provide a 
fruitful future. 
 As noted above, U.S. - Iranian relations have been characterized by covert 
operations through the years. This “tradition” first took hold in 1953. Now this is 
not to say that the two countries did not have ties before this by any means. This 
is to say that the covert operation trend begun in 1953 marked a turning point in 
the gravity of the nation's affairs and a change in the nature of the countries' 
relationship. 
 As former foreign correspondent for The Boston Globe and The New York 
Times Stephen Kinzer outlines in his book Overthrow, “In the years after World 
War II, the currents of nationalism and anti-colonialism surged across Asia, 
Africa and Latin America. They carried an outspokenly idealistic Iranian, 
Mohammad Mossadegh, to power in the spring of 1951.”1 As the country's new 
Prime Minister, Mossadegh's main goal was to modernize and democratize Iran, 
and for this he was immediately at odds with the nation's monarch Mohammad 
Reza Shah (the Shah). With passionate beliefs in democracy and nationalism, and 
a European education to boot, he looked to natural resources whose revenues 
favored extra-Iranian entities – this brought his attention to the British Oil giant 
BP. Seeing his country run by foreign institutions, and seeking to keep oil 
revenues at home for the betterment of his people, Mossadegh spearheaded a 
proposal that would nationalize Iran's oil fields.2 The nationalization law, which 
provided monetary compensation for the British Oil facilities, was unanimously 
approved by both houses of the Iranian parliament.3 
 Needless to say, BP and the British government were furious over the 
affair. British Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison said, “Persian oil is of vital 
importance to our economy. We regard it as essential to do everything possible to 
prevent the Persians from getting away with a breach of their contractual 
obligations.”4 Over the next few months, British authorities concluded that 
Mossadegh had to go and started brainstorming ideas on how to topple the new 
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Iranian Prime Minister.5 After several failed plans, British intelligence agent 
Christopher Woodhouse made a plea to Washington.6 Knowing that a call to 
overthrow Mossadegh because he nationalized a British oil company wouldn't stir 
rousing American support, especially since Time magazine had just named 
Mossadegh “Man of the Year” calling him “the Iranian George Washington”, 
Woodhouse drafted another idea.7  Woodhouse, with the guidance of Secretary of 
State John Dulles, figured they could portray Mossadegh's rule as Communist 
infiltration and that “the risk of leaving Iran 'open to Soviet aggression'” was a 
“compelling” factor in the necessity of American action.8 This, however, couldn't 
have been further from the truth. Mossadegh “abhorred Communist doctrine and 
rigorously excluded Communists from his government”, though allowed them to 
freely function.9 
 This move was historic. Never had an order like this come down; never 
had the CIA been ordered to overthrow a foreign government. And with John 
Dulles' brother, Allen, as the CIA director, there would be little resistance. 
 After receiving the newly elected President Eisenhower's approval, 
planning the coup began. The plan devised was unlike anything the CIA or British 
agents had ever seen. It ran as such: 
 
“...the Americans would spend $150,000 to bribe journalists, editors, 
Islamic preachers, and other opinion leaders to 'create, extend and enhance 
public hostility and distrust and fear of Mossadegh and his government.' 
Then they would hire thugs to carry out 'staged attacks' on religious 
figures and other respected Iranians, making it seem that Mossadegh had 
ordered them. Meanwhile, General Zahedi [the CIA's appointed coup 
leader] would be given a sum of  money... to 'win additional friends' 
and 'influence key people.' The plan budgeted another $11,000 per 
week...to bribe members of the Iranian parliament. On 'coup day', 
thousands of paid demonstrators would converge on parliament to demand 
that it dismiss Mossadegh. Parliament would respond with a 'quasi-legal' 
vote to do so. If Mossadegh resisted, military units loyal to Zahedi would 
arrest them.”10 
 
It all sounded well and good, but State Department archives were bulging with 
dispatches declaring that Mossadegh had “the backing of 95 to 98 percent of the 
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people”, a hurdle that would undoubtedly be hard to jump.11 But American 
operatives were optimistic, especially with U.S. Army General Norman 
Schwarzkopf attaining the Shah's secret blessing.12 Soon after, under the cover of 
night, CIA agent Kermit Roosevelt slipped into Iran and immediately set about 
his work to create a wed of artificial contempt.13 
 After several months, Roosevelt ordered the various Tehran street gangs 
(all of which were on the CIA payroll) to begin riots across the city. For a week, 
“a plague of violence descended on Tehran” with gangs and other thugs clashing, 
creating “the impression that the country was degenerating into chaos.”14 
Mossadegh sent the police to maintain order, unfortunately for him most of the 
police commanders were CIA bankrolled. 
 On August 19th, the climactic day of the riots, thousands took to the streets 
of Tehran demanding Mossadegh's resignation.15 General Zahedi proclaimed to 
the nation via radio broadcast that he had been named the new Prime Minister by 
the Shah while the military bombarded Mossadegh's house with tank shells, 
causing Mossadegh and his supporters to surrender to Zahedi's troops. The coup, 
codename Operation Ajax, having successfully ousted Mossadegh, concluded 
with Mohammad Reza Shah returning to his throne with a feeling of safety, 
Zahedi as the new Prime Minister and Mohammad Mossadegh sitting in jail. 
 The U.S. had succeeded in creating a more “favorable world order” that 
would be beneficial to “American political, economic, and security needs” by 
reinserting the Shah who was established as a pro-U.S. leader.16 But at what cost 
did this come to the Iranian people? The Shah took this opportunity to create an 
“increasingly oppressive” regime to ensure a level of security, a buffer, in his 
rule.17 He created the Savak, the secret police known for their brutality to protect 
his power.18 And now, with little opposition mounted against him, the Shah saw 
fit to strongly centralize his rule and exert more and more vertical authority. From 
this moment on, “the shah was free to shape Iran as he wished.”19 This, however, 
came with certain strings.  
 Thankful for the coup, and generally pro-U.S. to begin with, the Shah 
began working closely with the United States, “[becoming] one of America's most 
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trusted Cold War allies.”20 Through the next three decades of his rule, “U.S. 
economic and military aid poured into Iran.”21 According to Stephen McGlinchey 
of The National Interest, “By the time of Richard Nixon’s arrival in office in 
January 1969, Iran was already America’s single-largest arms purchaser.”22 
Moreover, during the Nixon administration, the U.S. “created a unique and 
unprecedented relationship with the Iranian ruler...dubbed the Twin Pillar 
policy.”23 Under this policy, the shah was identified as one of the primary 
“guardians” of U.S. interested in the Middle East, and in return, was permitted to 
purchase non-nuclear U.S. military technology with a “the blank check.”2425 This 
relationship, and the now blatantly obvious fact that the U.S. had a hand in the 
coup, led to undercurrents of anti-Americanism, though repressed.  This 
repression led to hush-hush talks in back alleys, led to finding solace in “radical” 
figures. As historian James A. Bill concludes, “[American intervention] locked 
the United States into a special relationship with the Shah and signaled the 
powerful entrance of American intelligence and military activity into Iran. The 
U.S. intervention alienated important generations of Iranians from America, and 
was the first fundamental step in the eventual rupture of Iranian-American 
relations in the revolution of 1978-79.”26 Which leads us to the next point: 
blowback. 
 Blowback, a term invented by the CIA, refers to the unintended 
consequences of American policies in relation to foreign policy and 
intervention.27 As Chalmers Johnson writes in his book Blowback, “In a broader 
sense, blowback is another way of saying that a nation reaps what it sows.”28 With 
this concept and definition in mind, and the 1953 coup case in the forefront, it is 
clear to see why the infamous Iranian Revolution of 1979 occurred; moreover, it 
is plain to see that the Iranian Revolution is perhaps the most concrete example of 
blowback in action. 
 In 1979, the country of Iran underwent radical changes during its violent 
revolution. Taking to the streets, angry crowds of Iranians protested the Shah's 
rule, “surging through the streets...crying “Death to the American Shah.”29 
                                                             
20 History Channel. “CIA-assisted coup overthrows government of Iran.” 
21 Ibid. 
22 McGlinchey, Stephen. “How the Shah Entangled America.” The National Interest. 
23 Sick, Gary. “The Iranian Premier: The Carter Administration.” United States Institute for 
Peace. 
24 Ibid. 
25 McGlinchey, Stephen. “How the Shah Entangled America.” The National Interest. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire (New York: 
Holt, 2004) pg. xi 
28 Ibid. 
29 Kinzer Stephen. Overthrow. New York: Holt, 2006. (pg. 202) 
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Leading this charge was the Islamic cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a 
fervently anti-Western figure. Khomeini's “revolutionary Islamist movement... 
promise[d] a break from the past and a turn toward greater autonomy for the 
Iranian people.”30 With this desire brewing for nearly 30 years, a movement 
snuffed by the U.S. with the coup, his movement became so powerful that the 
Shah was forced to flee from Iran and sought exile in Egypt. Soon after, needing 
cancer treatment, President Jimmy Carter allowed the Shah to enter the United 
States for his medical care. This outraged the revolting Iranian crowd stirring 
even more anti-American sentiments. In response, the new Ayatollah regime 
sanctioned the storming of the U.S. embassy in Tehran and the taking of 
hostages.31 On November 4 a group of pro-Ayatollah students smashed the gates 
and scaled the walls of the American embassy in Tehran holding 52 hostages 
captive. 
 Needless to say, the entire hostage crisis humiliated the United States. 
Donald Nuechterlein, in his book America Recommitted, goes so far as to call it 
“the most political damaging foreign policy problem...for the country's 
international prestige [at that time].”32 Implementing the Shah's rule had become a 
safety blanket for Presidential cabinets for decades, though it was indeed a false 
sense of security. More importantly, the mass of the American populace was 
oblivious to why the events occurred, chalking the affair up to irrational anti-
Americanism. However, one of the Iranian militants involved with the situation 
later explained their motivation as delayed retribution for American intervention 
in the form of the 1953 coup that altered the course of Iranian politics and 
government.33 As noted before, this is a clear case of blowback; American 
international affairs backfiring with unintended consequences. After numerous 
attempts to rescue the hostages, they were eventually returned safely to the Unites 
States after 444 days of captivity. This event, in turn, changed the relationship 
between the two nations forever. 
 The post hostage crisis interaction between Iran and the U.S. was nearly 
non-existent, the only spark arriving in 1983 after the bombing of the U.S. 
Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon. Hezbollah operatives that carried out the attack 
reportedly received “financial and logistical support” from Iran in what appears to 
be an act of retribution for America's past in the region or a move to eradicate 
U.S. influence in the region.34 Tensions were high and contempt ran deep on both 
sides. With the “umbilical cord” now severed between the two nations, some 
                                                             
30 History Channel. “Iran Hostage Crisis.” 
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sought to take advantage. 
 For years, Iran and Iraq had a very contentious relationship, bombing each 
other sporadically for some time. Finally, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein decided to 
invade Iran in September of 1980. According to an excerpt from The Reader’s 
Companion to Military History featured on the History Channel website: 
 
“When Saddam Hussein, president of Iraq, quite deliberately started the 
war, he miscalculated on two counts: first, in attacking a country greatly 
disorganized by revolution but also greatly energized by it-and whose 
regime could be consolidated only by a long 'patriotic' war, as with 
 all revolutionary regimes; and second, at the level of theater strategy, in 
launching a surprise  invasion against a very large country whose 
strategic depth he was not even trying to penetrate.”35 
 
What followed was one of the worst wars the region has ever seen, and through it 
all, the U.S. played a part. 
 In 1982, with Iraq's territorial gains into Iran lost to a strong counter strike, 
and the possibility of Iranian victory close at hand, the U.S. government 
implemented a two prong strategy to attempt to stop their new enemy. First, “the 
Reagan Administration [more specifically the CIA] secretly decided to provide 
highly classified intelligence to Iraq...while also permitting the sale of American-
made arms to Baghdad.”36 Second, “the U.S. actively engaged in an arms 
embargo against Iran called Operation Staunch” and pressured allies to do the 
same.37 With these two tools in use, Iraqi defeat was stalled and the bloody affair 
continued for several more years. With the war continuing, and an administration 
operating under the Reagan doctrine (stopping Communist influence), another 
American opportunity was seen, one that has lingered in political discourse with 
its infamy. 
 Half a world away, Nicaragua was at a crossroads with the Communist 
Cuban backed Sandinistas battling the insurgent Contras, who, according to then 
President Ronald Reagan were “'the moral equivalent of our Founding Fathers'.”38 
With this belief, the Contras' training, supplying and backing became the effort of 
the CIA. However, backing them involved a certain level of financial investment, 
a venture made near impossible by the Congressional passing of the Boland 
Amendment.39 Meanwhile, with Iran and Iraq still at war, Iran made a secret 
                                                             
35 History Channel. “Iran-Iraq War”. 
36 Hersh, Seymour. “U.S. Secretly Gave Aid to Iraq Early in Its War Against Iran.” The New 
York Times. 
37 Brown University. “The Iran Contra Affairs.” 
38 PBS: American Experience. “The Iran-Contra Affair.” 
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request to buy weapons from the United States.40 National Security Adviser 
Robert McFarlane began talking with Israeli and Iranian officials about the 
possibility of selling American made missiles to Iran using Israel as a buffer in the 
transaction. The buffer proposition was no doubt a means to circumvent the arms 
embargo still in place. This potential deal was prompted by Iran's dire need for 
weapons in the ongoing war with Iraq and America's interest in retrieving 
American hostages in Lebanon where Iran had considerable influence.41 With the 
foundation of the plan set, McFarlane approached President Reagan with the 
details in August of 1985.42 The President approved the sale of “approximately 
100 American-made TOW antitank missiles to Iran, seeing it as a chance to 
improve relations with Iran and to gain the release of hostages.”43 
 Nearly one month later, on September 15, 1985, American hostage 
Benjamin Weir was released by his captors due to Iran's influential voice.44 With 
the program of exchanging weapons for money and prisoner releases seeming to 
work seamlessly, this covert operation continued and expanded. United States 
Marine Corps Colonel Oliver North was brought in to the fold to help deal with 
the logistics of the transactions of money and weapons.45 This is where things got 
interesting. 
 With the ability to send money to the Contras limited to near nothing by 
the Boland Amendment, “North came upon the idea of overcharging the Iranians 
for weapons sold to them by Americans 'and using the surplus to fund the Contra 
resupply operation and other covert activities.'”46 The program continued for 
another year until the sales were discovered and the story leaked by the press in 
1986. In the end, “more than 1,500 missiles had been shipped to Iran and three 
hostages had been released - only to be replaced with three more.”47 
 The question then becomes: where did this leave U.S.-Iran relations? 
Despite working together to exchange favors, covertly at that, the United States 
still had hostages abroad that Iran couldn't, or didn't, help to return, who instead 
allowed them to be replaced. On top of that, the U.S. worked both sides of the 
Iran-Iraq war and turned a blind eye when the Iraqi army used chemical weapons 
in at least four major offensives that heavily relied on received U.S. intelligence.48 
As Shane Harris and Matthew Aid point out in their article for Foreign Policy 
                                                             
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Brown University. “Iran: The Beginning of the Affair.” 
43 Ibid. 
44 Brown University. “Iran Timeline.” 
45 Brown University. “Iran Timeline.” 
46 Brown University. “The Iran Contra Affairs.” 
47 PBS: American Experience. “The Iran-Contra Affair.” 
48 Harris, Shane, and Matthew M. Aid. “CIA Files Prove America Helped Saddam as He Gassed 
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Magazine, “U.S. intelligence officials conveyed the location of the Iranian troops 
to Iraq, fully aware that Hussein's military would attack with chemical weapons, 
including sarin, a lethal nerve agent.”49 While policy makers and military officials 
alike still maintain a certain level of denial in knowing what Saddam's actions 
would be, “retired Air Force Col. Rick Francona, who was a military attaché in 
Baghdad during the 1988 strikes, paints a different picture. 'The Iraqis never told 
us that they intended to use nerve gas. They didn't have to. We already knew...'”50 
Needless to say, the affair did nothing towards bridging the gap between the U.S. 
and Iran, not that it was really meant to be a durable solution to a still open 
wound. Best case scenario, relations broke even remaining unchanged. But even 
that best case scenario leaves the relationship between the two nations in a poor 
place. 
 Things remained quiet between the two countries for the next 20 years. 
The two nations had a brief relationship in the post 9/11 attacks world that 
involved Iran rounding up hundreds of al-Qaeda suspects and handing their 
information, though in a roundabout, covert way, to American authorities.51 
According to James F. Dobbins, the Bush administration's chief negotiator on 
Afghanistan, despite Iran being “'comprehensively helpful' in the aftermath of the 
9-11 attack in 2001 in working to overthrow the Taliban militias' rule and 
collaborating with the United States to install the Karzai government in Kabul”, 
the Bush administration was not interested in broader cooperation.”52 Soon after 
these events, then President Bush went so far as to call Iran a member of the new 
“axis of evil” and once again set relations down the road to utter failure. For the 
next few years, other than the occasional threat or political posturing, no Earth 
shattering events, especially covert ones, changed the state of affairs in any way. 
That is until Stuxnet. 
 As far back at the George W. Bush Presidency, the United States has been 
engaged in sophisticated cyber attacks against Iran under the project name 
“Operation Olympic Games.”53 However, the story of the Stuxnet virus, the most 
famous and really the only known example of these attacks, begins in June of 
2010 when it was first discovered. Within a month, a small group of high tech 
anti-virus experts were analyzing Stuxnet to figure out what its purpose was. For 
the researchers, the first hurdle when looking into Stuxnet involved how 
incredibly complicated and sophisticated it was – that is was beyond cutting edge. 
Liam O Murchu, one of the experts delving into the virus's secrets, determined 
                                                             
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
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52 Ibid. 
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that Stuxnet was “crawling around the world, computer by computer, looking for 
some sort of industrial operation that was using a specific piece of equipment, a 
Siemens S7-300 programmable logic controller.”54 This piece of computer 
equipment essentially runs manufacturing plants; it tells machines when to turn on 
and off. But what fascinated and confused O Murchu and his peers more than 
Stuxnet's complexity was that “We saw that 70% of the infections occur in Iran 
and that's very unusual for malware...”55 Soon after these revelations, Ralph 
Lagner, a German expert on industrial control systems, added another piece of 
important information. He concluded that the virus was specifically designed with 
a system of checks that forced it to only attack one target in the world: Iranian 
nuclear facilities56. As Steve Kroft, reporting for 60 Minutes, concluded: 
 
“By the fall of 2010, the consensus was that Iran's top secret uranium 
enrichment plant at Natanz  was the target and that Stuxnet was a 
carefully constructed weapon designed to be carried into the plant on a 
corrupted laptop or thumb drive, then infect the system, disguise its 
presence, move through the network, changing computer code and subtly 
alter the speed of the centrifuges without the Iranians ever noticing. 
Sabotage by software.”57  
 
 By the time this revelation had been made, it was too late to save Iran's 
nuclear facilities from Stuxnet's designed destructive behavior.  Many months 
before the virus was detected, inspectors from the IAEA (International Atomic 
Energy Agency) had noticed that the nuclear facility in Natanz, Iran was having 
serious problems with its centrifuges.58 Reports suggest that nearly one-fifth of 
Iranian centrifuges, about 1,000 to 2,000 units, were incapacitated, damaged and 
removed due to the corruption Stuxnet's attack brought forth.59 Then President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad blamed the cyber attack on enemies of the state and 
downplayed the damage to maintain appearances. The question then becomes: 
who would be behind such an attack? 
 Looking at this question through an American mindset, the first logical 
leap would be to accuse international terrorists; however, due to Stuxnet's 
complexity this almost certainly isn't the case. As Liam O Murchu pointed out in 
his interview with Steve Kroft, “What we do know is that this was a very large 
operation. You're really looking at a government agency from some country who 
is politically motivated and who has the insider information from a uranium 
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enrichment facility that would facilitate building a threat like this.”60 So if this 
attack was from a state based actor, who could it have been? This question is 
about as rhetorical as it gets. As seen through history, at least dating back to 1953, 
the United States and Iran have had a shaky relationship, especially when you 
factor in Iran's more recent goal of achieving nuclear capabilities. Other than 
Israel, the United States has the most to gain from destroying Iranian centrifuges 
and crippling their system. When this very idea was brought before former CIA 
head Michael Hayden, who would have been the agency's director at the inception 
of the attack, he responded saying, “I don't want to even suggest what may have 
been on the horizon or not on the horizon. Or anything like that...there is no good 
with someone of my background even speculating on that question, so I won't.”61 
 Needless to say, because of how confidential and top secret programs like 
these are, we may never know if the U.S. was behind the attack. That being said, 
there have been some very serious allegations made since the discovery of the 
attack. Not surprisingly, the county whose name has come up the most in these 
talks has been the United States. One such citation has come in the wake of 
Edward Snowden's NSA information leaks. During an interview conducted by 
German newspaper Der Spiegel, the “interviewers ask[ed] if the NSA helped 
create the Stuxnet virus. Snowden said, '[the] NSA and Israel co-wrote it.'”62 It 
then is only a small logical leap to assume that if the U.S. and Israel created the 
virus that one or both of the nations released it on Iran. More recently, a Christian 
Science Monitor article suggested that the U.S. intercepted shipments of Iranian 
nuclear facility equipment and tainted it with the virus before it entered the 
facility. This argument is supported by the fact that “leaked State Department 
cables posted on the WikiLeaks website show the US at that time to have been 
seeking to intercept shipments of [nuclear] equipment headed to Iran.”63  
 Regardless of what means were used to put it in place, as Ralph Lagner 
pointed out in his article for Foreign Policy Magazine, “uncovering Stuxnet was 
the end of the operation, but not necessarily the end of its utility.”64 It seems 
abundantly clear that the U.S. perpetrated this attack on Iran's nuclear system, 
even with abundant denials, “no-comments” and a handful of anonymous sources 
confirming American involvement. Furthermore, it wouldn't be surprising 
considering American strategic interests concerning Iran's fledgling nuclear 
program – interests to be discussed later. After all of this, President Obama, in the 
wake of Stuxnet, “decided to accelerate the [cyber] attacks” started under Bush 
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61 Ibid. 
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codenamed Operation Olympic Games.65 This has had the effect of further 
damaging U.S.-Iranian relations as, in a way, the U.S. is actively engaged in a war 
effort against them. While this effort may not be the traditional dropping of 
bombs and killing of people, as Ralph Lagner astutely concludes, “[there is] one 
thing we do know: [Stuxnet] changed global military strategy in the 21st 
century.”66 
 Moving beyond historical analysis, with the past covert conflicts between 
Iran and the U.S. freshly in mind, it is important to discern where the two nations 
are now, and more importantly, where they could be.  
 As things sit now, the United States has a total blanket embargo against 
Iran – nothing comes in, nothing goes out. More than that, Iran is continually 
demonized in the American media. Within the last decade, under President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, relations between the U.S. and Iran could not have been 
worse. This was a time at which Iran's nuclear capabilities were under the highest 
scrutiny. Fears of terrorism in the wake of the September 11th attacks spurred 
increased suspicion, rightly or wrongly so, into Iran's budding program. As noted 
before, this fear made former President Bush go so far as to call Iran part of the 
new “axis of evil”. In Colin S. Gray's book National Security Dilemmas,  he calls 
Iran “the menace of the decade and beyond and, as a result, the focus of most 
recent and current U.S. debate over the merit...in preventive war.”67 In a 2007 
report for 60 Minutes, reporter Scott Pelley asked President Ahmadinejad about 
Iran's controversial nuclear program. On the topic, President Ahmadinejad said,  
 
“Our plan and program is very transparent. We are under the supervision 
of the Agency. Everything is on the table. We have nothing to hide...what 
do you think that the nuclear technology is only limited in a bomb? You 
can only build a bomb with that?...We don't need that. What needs do we 
have for a bomb?”68 
 
It goes without saying that anyone can say one thing and do another, 
especially with Ahmadinejad's track record of threats, especially ones where he 
uses nuclear weapons against Israel – this being a major sticking point for U.S. 
lawmakers as Israel is one of, if not the, most important global allies. At this time, 
President Bush was quoted saying that if he could sit across from Iran's president 
and tell him what he thought of his leadership, he would say, “...that you've made 
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terrible choices for your people. You've isolated your nation you've taken a nation 
of proud and honorable people and made your country the pariah of the world...”69 
With the harsh rhetoric from both sides, it is easy to see that the wounds from the 
past have not healed, and that neither side was really interested in fostering any 
sort of growth. The last decade of U.S.-Iranian relations should be, if it hasn't 
been, marked as one of the worst periods of “diplomacy” between the two 
countries. While, with Ahmadinejad's leadership, this probably should have been 
the case, there is the serious present possibility of building a lasting, positive 
relationship with Iran. 
 While Iran is still run under a religious theocracy with Ayatollah 
Khamenei the new Supreme Leader, the country has been becoming increasingly 
democratic. Just last year, Hassan Rouhani was elected the new President of Iran 
in a surprising election. The moderate, reform minded “westernizer” is perhaps 
the greatest opportunity the United States has had in the last 30 years to build a 
relationship that can grow in a positive direction. 
 Earlier this year both sides took a step back from the hostile remarks and 
defamatory comments to sign a temporary “truce”. According to Steve Kroft of 
60 Minutes, “Iran agreed to freeze development of its nuclear capability and in 
exchange the U.S. and five world powers promised Iran some relief from 
economic sanctions.”70 The longer version of that deal is in the works now. 
 Iran and the U.S., accompanied by a handful of other significant world 
powers, have been ironing out the details for a nuclear deal. Before the most 
recent set of talks, Vice President Joe Biden said “there was a 'less than even shot' 
of a nuclear deal with Iran but that it was still worth pursuing”; furthermore, he 
“rejected calls for more sanctions against Tehran over its nuclear program 
because 'this is not the time to risk a breakdown when we still have a chance for a 
breakthrough.’”71 Middle East expert, and former adviser to Secretary of State 
Hilary Clinton, Vali Nasr, furthered this stance on sanctions, saying, “the pressure 
really has an impact on the Iranian economy -- it's kind of like trying to starve 
somebody. Yes, they do lose weight, and that only proves that starvation works. 
But it doesn't mean that starvation actually gets them to do what [you] want.”72 
This is right minded thinking for the new age of U.S.-Iranian relations. Right 
now, the U.S. has a golden opportunity to reestablish ties with Iran – further 
hurting the country has quite the opposite effect. The question with these nuclear 
talks revolves around whether or not the Iranian government will make 
concessions. When 60 Minutes reporter Steve Kroft asked this very question to 
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Said Fateh, a wealthy business mogul empowered by President Rouhani's 
privatizing of state-owned industry and increasing competition, he said, “It 
depends on the concessions, doesn't it? To stop it totally, I doubt it. But to reach 
some middle grounds, most probably.”73  
 This provides the potential first step to building bridges with Iran. The 
United States, just as much as Iran, can not take a hardline stance when it comes 
to these nuclear talks. The U.S. must be willing to concede. As Middle East expert 
Vali Nasr has pointed out, “the tightening of the screws is making Iran 
increasingly determined to get nuclear weapons – not to start a war, but to prevent 
one...Iran's leaders worry that foreign powers would 'feel safe enough to interfere 
in the affairs of a non-nuclear-armed state.’”74 Former Congressman Ron Paul has 
said much the same thing in his time in the political spotlight. Writing on the 
Iranian nuclear situation, Paul notes, “The unintended consequences of our 
confrontational policies toward Iran may be to actually encourage them to seek 
nuclear weapons capabilities. We should be using diplomacy rather than threats 
and hostility.”75 American policy makers need to see this; they need to see the 
conflict through Iran's eyes. Unfortunately, this so far hasn't been the case. 
 Recently, a letter co-signed by 47 Republican U.S. Senators was sent to 
Iran in, what appears to be, an attempt to derail the deal. The letter detailed the 
‘whim-sickle’ nature any executive action would have as opposed to a Congress 
ratified treaty. This seems to be a clear example of trying to scare Iran away from 
the table, making them fear any sense of security and relief from sanctions, no 
matter what concessions they make, as it could all crumble like a house of cards. 
The question is: why are so many American law-makers not only opposed to, but 
are attempting to undermine, these nuclear talks? There are a few potential 
reasons. 
 Firstly, and perhaps the most obviously, it could be Israeli influence in the 
realm of American foreign policy, especially that which deals with Iran. Before 
the publishing of the now infamous open letter to Iran, Israeli Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu spoke on the floor of the House “denounc[ing] the 
developing deal.”76 More recently, news agencies have reported stories of Israeli 
espionage regarding the closed door Iranian nuclear talks, using their intelligence 
to “help build a case against the emerging terms of the deal.”77 Of course, 
Netanyahu's, and Israel's, fear hinges on Iran's development of nuclear weapons, a 
fear the Israeli government preaches as reality. They seem to view any 
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compromise as a willing step towards the inevitable development of weapons. 
This is a view that has permeated American politics through osmosis. As one of 
America's biggest international allies, Israel has been granted a certain 'veto' 
power in foreign relations, often dictating a lot of the dialog. This relationship, 
mainly with Republican representatives with similar hawkish ideas, may be the 
most obvious reason such opposition has bee swirling around the talks, but it 
certainly isn't the only explanation. 
 Spinning off this U.S. - Israeli relationship briefly, this is one of the major 
reasons many hardliners in Iran are opposed to a nuclear deal. With a skeptical 
view concerning Western influence and, in some cases, a hatred for the nation of 
Israel, many Iranian hardliners, either overtly or covertly, aim to stop this deal. As 
the New York Times points out, many “hard-line Shiite Muslim clerics and 
Revolutionary Guards commanders [are] usually vocal on the subject of the 
Iranian nuclear program, loudly proclaiming the country’s right to pursue its 
interests and angrily denouncing the United States”; however, as of late they have 
been very quiet.78 Many analysts report this generally quiet demeanor and 
compliance with the Supreme Leader's request to continue the talks has to do with 
generally improving economic conditions and increased influence in the global 
and Middle Eastern landscapes.79 Despite President Obama saying that there are 
some, both domestically and abroad, that wish to see the talks derailed, Ayatollah 
Khamenei has said, “No one in Iran is against the resolution of the nuclear issue 
through negotiations. What the Iranian nation does not want to agree with is the 
impositions and bullying of the Americans.”80  
 That brief aside over, another explanation to why American law-makers 
are opposed to an Iranian nuclear deal is what implications any deal could have 
concerning Iranian influence in the region. As it stands, America has made it 
policy to keep a finger in every proverbial pie across the world. Whether that 
policy is right or wrong is not the question. What is the question is how a deal 
impacts Iran's influence in the world. If a deal is reached and Iran continues its 
nuclear program with no sanctions hampering economic activity, they most 
certainly will reap the socioeconomic benefits (in greater detail below). In turn, 
they may rise from their N-11 status to one of a BRICS country. This transition 
will undoubtedly raise they clout they have in the international community as well 
as the Middle East. In the wake of this, Iran will surely become a major influence 
in the region, pushing out America as the key power. This certainly must be a fear 
of the more hawkish members of the U.S. Congress seeing as how several wars 
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have been fought to gain power in the region. Despite these fears, valid as they 
may or may not be, it is prudent to herald back to the rather prophetic words of 
Ron Paul and Vali Nasr. While U.S. law-makers opposed to the Iran talks are 
opposed on the grounds that any deal will foster the development of nuclear 
weapons, it is equally, if not more certain, that further sanctions, harsh rhetoric 
and confrontational posturing will push Iran to develop a weapon for their own 
defense and autonomy. After all, as Mohammad Nahavandian, chief of staff to 
President Rouhani, said in an interview with Steve Kroft, “For Iran, [nuclear 
capability is] just another example of technological advancement.”81 This is 
something that can be seen in Persian culture through the ages. Iran is one of the 
best educated countries in the Middle East, on top of being one of the wealthiest 
and most sophisticated. They launched a satellite into space just a few years ago, a 
source of national pride. So more than just wanting a nuclear technology for 
defense, in the form of a weapon, it may be a point of showing the world what 
they are capable of – not to mention Iran's development could just be leading to 
nuclear energy and self sustainability. The waters of Iran's intentions remain 
unclear. What is clear is that America's hardline stand against any form of Iranian 
nuclear power, in any sense of the word, should be strongly reconsidered. 
 Continuing the theme of building bridges, one point that the U.S. and Iran 
could rally around in the present day is the fight against ISIS. For the past few 
months, the U.S. military has been bombarding ISIS fighters across Iraq and Syria 
in an attempt to defeat the radical movement. Joining this fight, though secretly, 
has been Iran. As Tim Arango and Thomas Erdbrink discuss in their article in The 
New York Times: 
 
“The apparent shift in Iran’s strategy has been most noticeable in Iraq, 
where even American officials acknowledge the decisive role of Iranian-
backed militias, particularly in protecting Baghdad from an assault by the 
Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, but also working with the 
American-led air campaign.”82 
 
While “working with” may be the wrong word here, there certainly is the chance 
for a little reconciliation. Iran has been fighting ISIS by their own rules. They 
have not joined the U.S. led effort to defeat them. Regardless of where the attacks 
are occurring, American officials are glad to have Iran's “cooperation”. Secretary 
of State John Kerry has said, “I think it’s self-evident that if Iran is taking on ISIL 
in some particular place and it’s confined to taking on ISIL and it has an impact, 
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it’s going to be — the net effect is positive.”83 While the U.S. and Iran are not 
coordinating their efforts, as Secretary Kerry indicated, the effect is still the same. 
More than that, “Hakim al-Zamili, an Iraqi politician and a Shiite militia leader, 
said, 'If there were an honest coordination between U.S. and Iranian advisers, Iraq 
could have been liberated within a week.’”84 If Iran and the United States were to 
come together to defeat a common enemy, we are shown yet another staging 
ground where further cooperation could be achieved. A positive working 
relationship here could build a positive working relationship elsewhere. Finding 
common interests is vitally important if the U.S. and Iran are going to repair the 
ties between them. However, as mentioned before, an American fear here is 
increased Iranian influence. 
 Let's assume that the U.S. and Iran join together in the coordinated effort 
against ISIS and they successfully eliminate them from the region. In that case, 
who 'conquers' the territory for the purpose of their own influence? Is it America 
located half a world away? Or is it Iran with just a few mountains separating them 
from the rest of the region. The best bet would most likely be on the latter. This 
would be a two prong issue for the United States and its strategic interests. First, it 
would disturb America's desire for a favorable world order where it maintains 
some semblance of control. Second, it would put into question America's 
relationship with the nations of OPEC and their oil supplies. Arguably, gaining 
this control has been one of the main American goals in the Middle East and 
seeing this influence slip would be a tragedy to many in the American political 
bureaucracy. Again this is not a call for an argument on ideology – it is a call to 
determine what U.S. policy would be in the wake of such an occurrence. It is hard 
to believe that the U.S. would let such an incident go by the wayside and accept 
such a change to the political organization of the region. On the flip side, it seems 
as though any form of military confrontation or hard power would be off the table 
as well. In this situation, what seems far more likely is a carbon copy of what we 
see now: sanctions and discussions. Using the 'carrot' here, persuading with 
positive incentives, would be the tool to counter Iranian influence in the region 
and promote American strategic interests. The U.S. wants a piece of the action 
just as much as Iran does. It would be a matter of working out an amicable 
arrangement as they are doing now. 
 Beyond regional influence and beyond the nuclear program itself, the 
implications of a deal transcend nuclear science altogether. More than anything 
else, a rekindled diplomatic link between Iran and America could be beneficial to 
both sides economically. With the crippling sanctions the U.S. has imposed on 
Iran for the greatest time, the hurt has really been felt. As Steve Kroft reports, 
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“The country's limited ability to export oil, import goods, and participate in the 
international banking system are largely responsible for high unemployment and 
an inflation rate of 30 percent.”85 Iranian markets have continually been an object 
of positive prospect, but the current web of U.S. sanctions has kept potential 
investors, businesses and the like at bay. And as one of the globes most promising 
emerging economies, it’s no wonder international business has their sights set on 
the blank slate which is Iran. The costs of everyday goods have skyrocketed, 
many Iranians wanting to see prices drop as the main result of any deals made 
with the U.S. Despite the sanctions though, American goods, and goods otherwise 
banned by sanctions, have been making their way into Iran for some time. Going 
to a mall, any Iranian can buy a pair of Nike sneakers and drive home in their new 
BMW. While the black market has been bringing these things in, it comes at a 
cost. Iranians pay two, three times as much as they should for common amenities. 
A healthy U.S.-Iranian economic friendship would help this plight. Not only that, 
but while it helped the masses of Iranians by providing cheaper, more accessible 
goods, it would also help boost the American economy. As CNN astutely 
observes, a deal with Iran opens up the 4th largest oil market and has the potential 
to drop international oil prices with an increase in supply.86 As stated before, this 
is an obvious U.S. strategic interest. Everyone wins. As Presidential Chief of Staff 
Mohammad Nahavandian put it, “instead of imposing economic sanctions” both 
sides should “try to utilize economic relations to overcome political 
disagreement.”87 
 What the U.S. faces now is a situation similar to that of the mid-1980's in 
the Soviet Union with Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev was a westernizer, a 
modernizer. He saw the potential for a relationship after years of hostility and 
sought to deal with American officials amicably. The Iran of today is no different. 
President Rouhani is “a reform-minded cleric who won a surprising and 
convincing victory by promising to improve the economy and end Iran's 
international isolation.”88 To do both of these things he must deal with the U.S. in 
one way or another. There is no reason the U.S. should hamper this process. With 
strong democratic principles at play in Iran, the U.S. should be glad to finally find 
a willing partner in the Middle East. Instead, the standoff continues. While some 
progress has been made there is still a long way to go. Even if a strong agreement 
can't be reached on the topic of their nuclear program, or their increased influence 
in the Middle East, it's important to recognize that diplomacy and cold war can 
co-exist. 
 And the way forward is diplomacy. Just last year, President Obama and 
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President Rouhani spoke over the phone, the first time the leaders of each 
respective country have spoken since 1979.89 In response to these talks, “Iranian 
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei endorsed Obama’s defense of 
diplomacy, describing the U.S. president’s talk of a window of opportunity as 
'good words.'”90 And according Vali Nasr, “diplomatic engagement” is the proper 
American policy moving forward91.  
 In order for the U.S. to effectively deal with Iran in foreign policy, one 
thing must be listened to: the will of the Iranian people. During his 60 Minutes in-
depth look into the Iran of today, Steve Kroft spoke with a man on the streets of 
Tehran that hit the nail on the head in two sentences: “What we want is not to 
impose anything to us. Nothing should be imposed by the U.S. to us.”92 And the 
U.S. must follow this policy. Moreover, 75% of Americans desire to deal 
diplomatically with Iran.93 For too long in both nation's intertwined history has 
the U.S. undermined and subverted the Iranian people through covert operations. 
For too long has the U.S. refused to deal with an important player in the world. 
An opportunity has presented itself and American policy makers would be fools 
not to take advantage. As President Rouhani's Chief of Staff Mohammad 
Nahavandian said, “Starting from foreign policy, you cannot find friends in Iran. 
But if you start from economics, from technological cooperation, from academic 
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